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We study the problem of secret key distillation from bipartite states in the scenario where Alice and
Bob can only perform measurements at the single-copy level and classically process the obtained
outcomes. Even with these limitations, secret bits can be asymptotically distilled by the honest
parties from any two-qubit entangled state, under any individual attack. Our results point out a
complete equivalence between two-qubit entanglement and secure key distribution: a key can be
established through a one-qubit channel if and only if it allows to distribute entanglement. These
results can be generalized to higher dimension for all those states that are one-copy distillable.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.-a
Quantum correlations or entanglement is the basic in-
gredient for many applications of Quantum Information
Theory [1]. By exploiting the correlations of entangled
states, one can perform tasks that are impossible in Clas-
sical Information Theory. Quantum cryptography [2],
or more precisely quantum key distribution, is the most
successful Quantum Information application, due to its
experimental feasibility with present-day technology. Al-
though entanglement is not required for a secure key dis-
tribution [3], there exist proposals using entangled states
[4]. Indeed, it is unclear which role entanglement plays
in quantum cryptography protocols. In this work, we
analyze the problem of secret key extraction in the fol-
lowing scenario: after a distribution stage, two honest
parties, Alice and Bob, share a quantum state. This
state is translated into a probability distribution by local
measurements at the single-copy level, and the obtained
outcomes are processed in order to distill a secret key. We
denote by SIMCAP this SIngle-copy Measurements plus
ClAssical Processing scenario. This is a common scenario
in Quantum Information applications, where useful cor-
relations are distributed between two or more parties by
means of entangled states. For two-qubit systems and in-
dividual attacks, we prove that Alice and Bob can distill
a key by a SIMCAP protocol if and only if they initially
share an entangled state. Thus, two-qubit entanglement
is indeed equivalent to secure key distribution.
Our result links the security of one-qubit channels with
their entanglement capability. In the usual formulation of
Quantum Cryptography, first a protocol for key distribu-
tion is proposed and later possible eavesdropping attacks
on it are analyzed. However, one can reverse this stan-
dard presentation and, after specifying an eavesdropping
attack, look for a secure key distribution protocol. This
is indeed closer to what happens in a practical situation:
the honest parties are connected by a given channel, de-
noted by Υ, that is fixed and known. It depends on exper-
imental parameters such as, for instance, dark counts or
optical imperfections, and is the only non-local quantum
resource Alice and Bob share. From the quantum cryp-
tography point of view, it is conservatively assumed that
Eve has total access to the channel. This means that the
definition of the quantum channel is equivalent to specify
Eve’s interaction with the sent states. When does a given
channel allow the honest parties to securely establish a
secret key, in the SIMCAP scenario? Our results imply
that a one-qubit channel is secure as soon as it allows
entanglement distribution. For any entangling channel
we show how to construct the corresponding SIMCAP
key distillation protocol. Moving to higher dimension,
our results immediately hold for all those bipartite states,
and corresponding channels, that are one-copy distillable.
Thus, they suggest a complete equivalence between dis-
tillable entanglement and secure key distribution.
Let us start with the simplest case of two qubits. A
two-qubit entangled state is locally prepared by Alice
and one of the two qubits is sent to Bob through a quan-
tum channel. Since the channel is not perfect, Alice and
Bob end with a two-qubit mixed state, ρAB [5]. They
attribute the channel imperfections to the eavesdropper,
Eve, who interacts with the sent qubits. We assume, as
it is often done in many works on Quantum Cryptogra-
phy, that Eve applies an individual attack: she lets inde-
pendent auxiliary systems interact with each qubit and
measures each system before the key extraction process
[6]. Since Eve has a perfect control on her interaction,
the global state of the system is pure, |ΨABE〉. The state
shared by Alice and Bob is the one resulting from trac-
ing out Eve, ρAB = trE(|ΨABE〉〈ΨABE |). The global
pure state including Eve is, without loss of generality,
|ΨABE〉 =
r∑
i=1
√
ri |i〉|ie〉, (1)
where |ΨABE〉 ∈ C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗Cr, {ri, |i〉} define the spec-
trum of ρAB, r is its rank and ie is an orthonormal basis
on Eve’s space. By computing the Schmidt decomposi-
tion with respect to the partition AB−E, one can easily
see that any other state |Ψ˜ABE〉 ∈ C2⊗C2⊗CdE , where
2dE ≥ r, such that trE(|Ψ˜ABE〉〈Ψ˜ABE |) = ρAB, is com-
pletely equivalent to |ΨABE〉.
If ρAB is entangled, one can consider the following fully
quantum protocol for key distribution. The honest par-
ties run a quantum distillation protocol [7] that trans-
forms many copies of the initial mixed entangled state
into fewer copies of a maximally entangled state [8]. In
this way, Eve becomes uncorrelated to Alice and Bob,
who can safely measure in one basis, say z, and obtain
the secret key. Note that in these protocols the honest
parties must be able to perform quantum operations on
several copies of their local states. This is in strong con-
trast to the SIMCAP scenario where all the collective
actions are performed at the classical level, while quan-
tum physics is only used for the correlation distribution.
Does this limit the possibility of distilling a key?
It is worth to mention here that the experimental re-
quirements for the SIMCAP protocols are definitely less
stringent than for quantum distillation protocols. In par-
ticular, no quantum memory is needed, avoiding decoher-
ence problems. Moreover, our scenario reflects precisely
what is feasible with current technology, in contrast to
joint operations and quantum memories, that are impos-
sible on a large scale even in the near future.
Theorem: Consider the situation in which Alice and
Bob share unlimited many instances of a two-qubit state,
ρAB. Under individual attacks, they can distill a secret
key from them by measurements at the single-copy level
and classical processing of the outcomes if and only if
ρAB is entangled.
Proof: It was shown in [9] that there exists a unique
local filtering operation, FA ⊗ FB with F †AFA ≤ 1 2 and
F †BFB ≤ 1 2, mapping with some probability any two-
qubit state into a state diagonal in a Bell basis [10],
ρ′AB = Λ1|Φ+〉〈Φ+|+ Λ2|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|
+ Λ3|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|+ Λ4|Φ−〉〈Φ−|. (2)
The local bases can be chosen such that |Φ+〉 is the
eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue, Λ1 =
max({Λi}). This transformation maps entangled states
into entangled Bell diagonal states [9]. After applying
this filtering operation to ρAB, the honest parties share
a Bell diagonal state (2), while the global state is
|Ψ′ABE〉 = λ1|Φ+〉|1〉+ λ2|Ψ+〉|2〉
+ λ3|Ψ−〉|3〉+ λ4|Φ−〉|4〉, (3)
with λi =
√
Λi. Since the positivity of the partial trans-
position [11] is a necessary and sufficient condition for
separability in C
2 ⊗ C2 systems, ρ′AB is entangled iff
Λ1 > Λ2 + Λ3 + Λ4 = 1− Λ1. (4)
After a successful local filtering, Alice and Bob mea-
sure ρ′AB in the z basis, obtaining a partially correlated
list of symbols, {ai} and {bi}. The measurements in the
z basis terminate the measurement step in the SIMCAP
distillation protocol, after which the original quantum
state has been translated into a probability distribution
[12]. From Eq. (3), Eve’s non-normalized states, |eAB〉,
depending on Alice and Bob’s results are, where R = 0, 1,
|eRR〉 = 1√
2
(λ1|1〉+ (−1)Rλ4|4〉)
|eR(1−R)〉 =
1√
2
(λ2|2〉+ (−1)Rλ3|3〉). (5)
Note that Eve knows in a deterministic way whether Al-
ice and Bob differ in their measurement outcomes (which
implies IAE = IBE). This happens with probability
ǫB = ‖e01‖2 + ‖e10‖2 = Λ2 + Λ3, (6)
which is Bob’s error probability.
In order to classically distill a key, Alice and Bob will
now apply the advantage distillation protocol described
in Ref. [13] to their measurement outcomes. If the state
is close to |Φ+〉, the mutual information between the
honest parties, IAB, is larger than Eve’s information,
IE = min(IAE , IBE). Then, no advantage distillation
protocol is in principal required, since privacy amplifica-
tion [14], a more efficient key distillation protocol, suf-
fices. Nevertheless, we deal with advantage distillation
protocols because they allow to extract a key even in sit-
uations where IAB ≤ IE [15]. The advantage distillation
protocol works as follows: if Alice wants to establish the
bit x with Bob, she randomly takes N items from her list
of symbols, ~a = (a1, a2, . . . , aN ), and sends to Bob the
vector ~x such that ai+xi = x mod 2, ∀ i = 1, . . . , N , plus
the information about the chosen symbols. Bob com-
putes bi + xi, and whenever he obtains the same result,
bi+xi = y, ∀ i, he accepts the bit. If not, the symbols are
discarded and the process is repeated for a new vector of
length N . Bob’s error probability is now [13]
ǫBN =
(ǫB)
N
(1− ǫB)N + (ǫB)N ≤
(
ǫB
1− ǫB
)N
, (7)
that tends to an equality for N →∞.
Notice that for large N , x = y with very high probabil-
ity. Hence we concentrate on the states |ei〉 ≡ |eii〉/‖eii‖,
and denote Ei the corresponding projectors. Eve applies
a generalized measurements (POVM) of M outcomes,∑
iMi = 1 2 with Mi > 0, trying to acquire informa-
tion about these states. Indeed, since ~a is chosen at ran-
dom, we assume Eve’s measurement to be the same for all
qubits without loosing generality. Moreover, any generic
measurement can be seen as a measurement consisting
of rank-one operators where some of the outcomes are
later combined, so we can take Mi = |mi〉〈mi|, ∀ i, with
‖mi‖ ≤ 1. After the measurements, Eve uses all the
information collected from the N symbols for guessing
3x. From ~x, she knows that the bit string was equal to
~a = (a1, a2, . . . , aN) or to ~a
′ = (1−a1, 1−a2, . . . , 1−aN ),
corresponding to 1 − x. Independently of her decision
strategy, there are instances where she will make an er-
ror. For example, when the number of zeros in ~a is
the same as the number of ones (the same holds for ~a′),
and the number of times any measurement outcome has
been obtained is the same for zeros and ones [16]. These
events do not give her any information about x, so she
is forced to guess and makes a mistake with probability
1/2. Therefore, her error probability is bounded by
ǫEN ≥ 1
2
1
2N
∑
n1,...,nM
N !
(2n1)! . . . (2nM )!
(
2n1
n1
)
tr(E0M1)
n1tr(E1M1)
n1 · · ·
(
2nM
nM
)
tr(E0MM )
nM tr(E1MM )
nM , (8)
with 2
∑
i ni = N . The factor 1/2
N takes into account
the number of possible vectors ~a, while the combinato-
rial terms count the number of vectors satisfying our re-
quirements. When N is large, one can approximate the
combinatorial term (2ni)! /(ni! )
2 ≃ 22ni and then
ǫEN &
1
2
∑
ni
N !
(2n1)! . . . (2nM )!
M∏
i=1
(tr(E0Mi)tr(E1Mi))
ni .
(9)
In the same limit, this sum is equal to
ǫEN &
1
2
1
2M−1
(
M∑
i=1
√
tr(E0Mi)tr(E1Mi)
)N
. (10)
Since Mi are rank-one operators,
M∑
i=1
√
tr(E0Mi)tr(E1Mi) =
M∑
i=1
|〈e0|Mi|e1〉| ≥ |〈e0|e1〉|,
(11)
where in the last step we used that {Mi} is a resolution
of the identity. These equations imply that, for large N ,
Eve’s error probability is bounded by an exponential term
|〈e0|e1〉|N . This bound is tight: a simple measurement
in the x (i.e. (|1〉 ± |4〉)/√2) basis attains it (see Fig. 1
and the appendix).
Now, Alice and Bob can establish a key whenever
ǫB
1− ǫB < |〈e1|e0〉| (12)
since then (see Eq. (7)) Bob’s error probability decreases
exponentially faster than Eve’s, and this condition is
known to be sufficient for key distillation [17]. More pre-
cisely: if Eq. (12) is satisfied, there exists a finite N
such that Alice and Bob, starting from the raw data and
using this protocol, end with a smaller list of symbols
where IAB > IE . Then, they can apply privacy amplifi-
cation techniques [14] and distill a key. Using Eqs. (5)
and (6), condition (12) can be shown to be equivalent
to Eq. (4). Since Alice and Bob cannot establish a key
when the state ρAB is separable [18], we conclude that
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FIG. 1: Example of measurement attaining the bound of Eq.
(11), where the first outcome, |m0〉, is associated to 0, the
second, |m1〉, symmetric to |m0〉 with respect to the z axis,
to 1 and the third, |m?〉 = | + z〉, to an inconclusive result.
The weight of |m?〉 is minimized. One can consider simi-
lar three-outcome measurements, just changing the angle be-
tween |m0〉, or |m1〉, and the z axis. All the measurements
such that |m0〉 is between |+ x〉 and |e⊥1 〉 saturate the expo-
nential bound. This does not mean that ǫEN is the same for
all of them. The limiting cases, |m0〉 = |e⊥1 〉 and |m0〉 = |+x〉,
correspond to the optimal measurements for unambiguous dis-
crimination and for maximizing Eve’s information.
a secret key can be distilled in the SIMCAP scenario if
and only if the initially shared state is entangled. 
Our results imply the equivalence between entangle-
ment and security for qubit channels: if a one-qubit chan-
nel, Υ, allows to distribute entanglement, key distribu-
tion is possible. Indeed, this means that there exists a
bipartite state, |Φ〉 ∈ C2 ⊗ C2, such that
ρΦAB = (1 2 ⊗Υ)(|Φ〉) (13)
is entangled. Alice can then prepare the state |Φ〉 locally
and send half of it to Bob through the noisy channel Υ.
After this distribution stage, the honest parties run the
presented SIMCAP protocol and distill a secret key from
ρΦAB. Two points deserve to be mentioned here. First,
note that if one places the state preparation on Alice’s
4side, she can start with the state “as if it had passed
her filter”, i.e. FA = 1 2. And second, there is actu-
ally no need of entanglement in the protocol. Indeed,
it can be translated into an equivalent protocol without
entanglement using the same ideas as in Ref. [3]. Alice’s
measurement can be incorporated into the state prepara-
tion, before the state distribution [19]. Then, she sends
through the channel, with probability 1/2, one of the two
states |ψ±B〉 ∈ C2, defined as
|ψ±B〉 =
√
2 (〈±z| ⊗ 1 2) |Φ〉. (14)
Bob receives the states ρ±B = Υ(|ψ±B〉). He applies the
filter FB and measures in the z basis. Of course, the ob-
tained probabilities are exactly the same as in the SIM-
CAP protocol using |Φ〉, so Alice and Bob can securely
distill a key without using any entanglement.
For all the protocols, with and without entanglement,
it is assumed that the channel is fixed. Note that for
some channels, the states |ψ±B〉 may be orthogonal and
form a basis. Eve could then replace her interaction by an
intercept-resend attack: she measures in that basis and
prepares a new state for Bob. But this would dramat-
ically change the channel. Thus, Alice and Bob should
randomly interrupt the key distribution and switch to a
check stage where they monitor the channel. Entangle-
ment is not required for this stage either. Those channels
that do not allow to distribute entanglement are called
entanglement breaking. They can be written as [20]
Υ(|ψ〉) =
∑
k
tr(Lk|ψ〉〈ψ|) ρk, (15)
where ρk are density matrices and {Lk} define a gen-
eralized measurement, i.e. Lk ≥ 0 and
∑
k Lk = 1 2.
From a cryptography point of view, this just represents
an intercept-resend attack, as the one described above.
To conclude, we have seen that, under arbitrary indi-
vidual attacks, a secret key can be established in the SIM-
CAP scenario if and only if the two-qubit state shared
by Alice and Bob is entangled. This gives a one-to-one
correspondence between two-qubit entanglement and se-
cure key distribution: any one-qubit channel that is not
entanglement breaking is secure. It would be interest-
ing to extend our results to higher dimensional systems
(some preliminary results can be found in Ref. [21]),
where there are entangled states, known as bound en-
tangled [22], that are not quantum distillable. Our anal-
ysis can be trivially extended to the so-called one-copy
distillable states, those states for which there exist lo-
cal projections onto two-dimensional subspaces such that
the resulting two-qubit state is entangled. The honest
parties should simply include these projections as a first
step in the measurement part of the distillation proto-
col. This fact suggests a complete equivalence between
distillable entanglement and key distribution. According
to it, the so-called entanglement binding channels, those
channels through which only bound entanglement can be
established [23], would be useless for key distribution,
although this remains unproven. A related open ques-
tion is the conjectured existence of a classical analog of
bound entanglement, known as bound information [18],
that seems to appear in some probability distributions
P (a, b, e) derived from bound entangled states.
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Appendix: In this appendix we present several mea-
surements strategies for Eve that attain the exponential
bound of Eq. (11). For all these strategies, Eqs. (8), (9)
and (10) become an equality in the limit of large N . In
other words, the r.h.s. of these equations represent the
relevant term of ǫEN when N →∞. Thus, we only need
to check Eq. (11) for the given measurements.
First, consider a projective measurement in the x basis
(see Fig. 1), i.e. M1 = | + x〉〈+x| and M2 = | − x〉〈−x|.
This is the optimal measurement in terms of Eve’s in-
formation and error probability. Eve acquires informa-
tion about x from all the N measurement outcomes. Al-
though we are not interested in her decision strategy, she
can associate |+ x〉 (| − x〉) to |e0〉 (|e1〉) and then apply
a majority rule for guessing x. It is now easy to see that
〈e0|M1|e1〉 = 〈e0|M2|e1〉 > 0, and therefore the inequal-
ity (11) is saturated by this measurement.
A second possibility corresponds to the measurement
optimizing Eve’s probability of inconclusive result. It
consists of three operators, M1 = c |e⊥1 〉〈e⊥1 |, M2 =
c |e⊥0 〉〈e⊥0 | and M3 = c? | + z〉〈+z|. Note that if the first
(second) outcome is obtained, Eve knows that the state
was |e0〉 (|e1〉) with certainty, while she obtains no infor-
mation from M3. The weights c and c? are chosen such
that the probability of inconclusive result is minimized,
giving p? = 〈e0|M3|e0〉 = 〈e1|M3|e1〉 = |〈e1|e0〉|. In this
case it is simple to compute ǫEN for all N . Knowing one
of the symbols used in ~a plus the information in ~x allows
Eve to deduce x. Only when she has obtained N incon-
clusive results she is forced to guess, making a mistake
in half of the cases. Then, her error probability reads
ǫEN =
1
2 |〈e1|e0〉|N , which attains the bound.
Finally, all the measurements interpolating in a coher-
ent (or incoherent) way between these two strategies also
attain the bound (see Fig. 1). Indeed it is simple to see
that the inequality (11) is saturated by all of them. Let
us stress again here that this does not mean that ǫEN is
the same for all these measurements, but only that its
exponential behavior goes like |〈e1|e0〉|N for large N , i.e.
limN→∞ log ǫEN = N log |〈e1|e0〉|.
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